Implementing EU's Normative Agenda in the South Caucasus: Contradictory effects

It is not a secret that the EU has sought to influence regional developments by imposing liberal democratic norms on the third countries interested in closer relations with the union. Given that this soft power approach may effect change, we analysed the role of EU normative powers in influencing human rights dialogues. We also saw how both the political establishments and societies at large have adapted to these new circumstances. Further to the east, the lever for Europeanization seems to be eroding. To that end, the EU has continuously reaffirmed that its support for and cooperation with target countries must be conditional on the promotion of civil liberties and democratic reforms. While there is concern that the EU’s normative policies may be ineffective if they are not fully implemented on the ground, it is possible that the prospect of EU integration could prove to be an attractive aspiration for large segments of these societies. Fully implementing EU norms, however, may drive these countries into conflict with the conservative mores sustained by the state/religious institutions

Current Geopolitical Thought and Estonia: A Critical Approach

According to the conventional definition , geopolitical codes are sets of strategic assumptions that a government makes about other states in shaping its foreign policy. In global politics the USA and Russia are in different ideological positions: ranging from neo-Cominternism to neo-Wilsonianism on the other. When the USA judges that effective collective security is built on the solid foundation of American military capability and leadership, then Russia is worrying about the changing global equilibrium, as well as the Russian state and the emerging security vacuums around it. The US and Russian geopolitical thinking is not simply conflicting or opposed to each other, but they rather represent different standpoints. Neither the United States nor Russia has been a truly European power and both have talked far more about their missions than about their interests. The US overseas presence is justified by geopolitical reasoning focused on defending US interests in critical regions and preventing the development of power vacuums and threats to regional security

Current Geopolitical Thought and Estonia: A Critical Approach

According to the conventional definition , geopolitical codes are sets of strategic assumptions that a government makes about other states in shaping its foreign policy. In global politics the USA and Russia are in different ideological positions: ranging from neo-Cominternism to neo-Wilsonianism on the other. When the USA judges that effective collective security is built on the solid foundation of American military capability and leadership, then Russia is worrying about the changing global equilibrium, as well as the Russian state and the emerging security vacuums around it. The US and Russian geopolitical thinking is not simply conflicting or opposed to each other, but they rather represent different standpoints. Neither the United States nor Russia has been a truly European power and both have talked far more about their missions than about their interests. The US overseas presence is justified by geopolitical reasoning focused on defending US interests in critical regions and preventing the development of power vacuums and threats to regional security

The Do-or-Die Dilemma Facing Post-Soviet De Facto States

This memo discusses the “do or die” dilemma of post-Soviet de facto states. Our examination looks in to patron-client relations that are highly unequal and asymmetric in terms of resources and capabilities: Russia vis-à-vis Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, and Armenia vis-à-vis Nagorno-Karabakh. While relying entirely on a militarily and economically resourceful external patron is often seen as the only viable option, de facto states may be risking the loss of their “independence.” Hence their “do or die” dilemma that structures many of their policies

Why the International Community Should Be More Accommodating to De Facto States

De facto states are notorious for their pariah status, constant security deficit, and embryonic institutions, producing the perception that they are states-in-the-making perpetually striving for sheer survival. Their reliance on a patron is considered proof that they would not be viable states and thus are incapable of having independent agency. Without the freedom of choice, these entities lack deliberate will for action, and without capacity to do, they can hardly be in a position of exerting power. A focus on agency allows us to ask how far and in what ways these unrecognized entities have been able to act in the international system. We demonstrate that, despite their limited capacity, de facto states do display some agency, and that their foreign policy choices are sometimes not remarkably different from recognized small states or micro-states. Even imperfect agency may bring relief for local policymakers who are supposed to alleviate anarchy and chaos in their daily practices. The international community, we argue, should thus be more accommodating to de facto states; if their agency is continuously denied, they will be both increasingly reliant on their patron and separated from the international community

Introduction: a conceptual framework for engagement with de facto states

Secessionist de facto states, by their very nature, sit outside of the international system. Having unilaterally declared independence from their parent state, they are invariably prevented from joining the United Nations, and thus taking their place as members of the community of universally recognised countries. While the reasons for such punitive approaches have a logic according to prevailing political and legal approaches to secession, it is also recognised that isolation can have harmful effects. Ostracising de facto can not only hinder efforts to resolve the dispute by reducing their willingness to engage in what they see as an asymmetrical settlement process, it can also force them into a closer relationship with a patron state. For this reason, there has been growing interest in academic and policy circles around the concept of engagement without recognition. This is a mechanism that provides for varying degrees of interaction with de facto states while maintaining the position that they are not regarded as independent sovereign actors in the international system. As is shown, while the concept has its flaws, it nevertheless opens up new opportunities for conflict management

Between Security and Mobility: Negotiating a Hardening Border Regime in the Russian-Estonian Borderland

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies on 27th Feb 2015, available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1015408Since the end of the Cold War order post-Soviet borders have been characterised by geopolitical tensions and divergent imaginations of desirable political and spatial orders. Drawing upon ethnographic research in two border towns at the Russian-Estonian border, the article makes a case for a grounded examination of these border dynamics that takes into account how borders as sites of ‘mobility and enclosure’ are negotiated in everyday life and shaped by the differentiated incorporations of statecraft into people’s lives. Depending on their historical memories, people interpret the border either as a barrier to previously free movement or as a security device and engage in correspondingly different relations to the state – privileging local concerns for mobility or adopting the state’s concerns over security and sovereignty. Analysing these border negotiations and the relations between citizens and the state, articulated in people’s expectations and claims, can provide us with a better understanding of how people participate in the making of borders and contribute to the stability and malleability of political orders

Bridging the divide between parent states and secessionist entities: a new perspective for conflict management?

This paper departs from the contested nature of the border that separates each side in secessionist conflict – the parent state considers this as an internal administrative line; the de facto state, conversely, sees this as an international border. The argument made builds upon the theoretical aspects of the bordering practices in the current literature, and then examines three cross-border cases – Mainland China-Taiwan, Cyprus-Northern Cyprus and Moldova-Transnistria, to demonstrate different patterns of cross-border interactions and their achieved outcomes. It questions why border-crossing practices have either brought about normalization in degrees, or with a questionable value? This paper makes the conclusion that although border-crossing practices have normalized relations between adversaries, they have also simultaneously brought along self-perpetuating separation as most of the divisions still persist today. Redefining borders and facilitating cross-border interactions has only had a limited contribution to conflict management

How do you tailor diplomatic training? Sizing up peer institutions and their training practices for the Diplomatic School of Armenia

The Diplomatic School of Armenia (est. in 2009) explored how its peer institutions were organized, how they tailored their training programmes and how any existing structures and practices could be suited for Armenia. This paper reviews part of a comparative study which was carried out in 2013–2014. We include a sample of 14 institutes and training centres, ranging from countries which had diplomatic training fully integrated into the ministerial structures to those where the institute had become an entirely separate entity; including states where training focused strictly on skills development, as well as those cases where the focus had turned to offering post-graduate studies. It appears that all peer institutions have followed unprecedented development paths, becoming today’s diplomatic training centres, schools and academies. This made the tailoring exercise for Armenia even more challenging

Land for peace : can territorial adjustments bring about recognition of self-determination claims?

First published online: 09 July 2020De facto states represent an anomalous sovereign condition. Their parent states are unable to regain control over the territory that de facto states possess, while the de facto states are unable to secure widespread recognition of their self-determination claims without the consent of their parent states. Kosovo and Serbia have recently entertained the idea of making territorial adjustments through which a settlement between the two parties can be reached. Regardless of whether or not such an agreement will be achieved, this paper probes if and the extent to which agreements for territorial adjustments can end the anomalous sovereign condition of de facto states. To do so, it develops a novel analytical framework, employs two case studies, and analyses how crucial and supplementary conditions may jointly interact to (dis)allow possible 'land for peace' agreements. The paper finds that the likelihood of territorial compromises remains low because the peaceful reconciliation does not outweigh the tangible and intangible values of the territory